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Abstract
We investigated whether the personal importance of objects influences utilitarian decision-making in which damaging
property is necessary to produce an overall positive outcome. In Experiment 1, participants judged saving five objects by
destroying a sixth object to be less acceptable when the action required destroying the sixth object directly (rather than as
a side-effect) and the objects were personally important (rather than unimportant). In Experiment 2, we demonstrated that
utilitarian judgments were not influenced by the objects’ monetary worth. Together these findings suggest that personal
importance underlies people’s sensitivity to damaging property as a means for utilitarian gains.
Keywords: personal importance, value, moral decision-making, ownership.
1 Introduction
Like most people, you possess many objects. Although you
may find many of these objects useful, probably just a few
of them are personally important to you. For instance, you
may have many articles of clothing, but only one favorite
sweater. The importance you place on such cherished pos-
sessions is subjective and does not necessarily reflect their
monetary value or their utility. For instance, your favorite
sweater might have cost you relatively little (and it is surely
worth even less money now) and it may not be particularly
warm or attractive. Nonetheless, it may mean more to you
than anything else that you own.
Personal attachment to objects begins in early childhood
(Busch & McKnight, 1976; Winnicott, 1953) and manifests
itself in an emotional attachment for certain objects and a
preference for them over other objects — even exact du-
plicates (Frazier, Gelman, Wilson & Hood, 2009; Hood &
Bloom, 2008; Schultz, Kleine & Kernan, 1989). Adults and
children often look to their cherished items for comfort in
times of distress (Diesendruck & Perez, 2015; Dyl & Wap-
ner, 1996) and older adults use cherished possessions to help
provide a sense of self-continuity and identity-maintenance
(Kroger & Adair, 2008). Such findings suggest that per-
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sonally important objects may be viewed as extensions of
their owners and part of owners’ identity (e.g., Belk, 1988;
Kleine, Kleine & Allen, 1995).
Personal importance also influences how people think and
feel about property loss. People are often unwilling to sell
or exchange cherished possessions, and when they do sell
them, they demand especially high prices (Hood & Bloom,
2008; Medin, Schwartz, Blok & Birnbaum, 1999; Nadler
& Diamond, 2008). For instance, when reading vignettes
discussing how much someone should sell their home for,
participants indicate that more money should be requested if
the home has been in the family for generations rather than
only a few years (Nadler & Diamond, 2008). People report
greater distress over the loss and damage of sentimental ob-
jects than other objects (Brown & Harris, 1989), and the
psychological distress caused by damage to personal items
is consistent with the pattern of distress exhibited by victims
of physical assault (Wirtz & Harrell, 1987). Moreover, peo-
ple report being more willing to go out of their way to seek
compensation for damaged property if the property was per-
sonally important to them (Hsee & Kunreuther, 2000). Per-
sonal importance is also recognized in law enforcement as
police employ more elaborate techniques when investigat-
ing burglaries of sentimental objects (Stenross, 1984), sug-
gesting an appreciation for the distress the loss of cherished
possessions causes.
1.1 Personal importance and utilitarian rea-
soning
In some situations, damaging someone’s property — per-
sonally important or not — may be necessary in order to
produce an overall better outcome. For instance, preventing
paint from spilling onto a beautiful carpet may require ru-
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ining a towel; building a hospital may require tearing down
a family home; and staving off frostbite might only be pos-
sible if a cherished book is used to fuel a fire. Such de-
cisions, which favor making sacrifices in order to produce
a net benefit, reflect utilitarian decision-making. However,
according to legal theorist Margaret Radin (1982), such util-
itarian decisions are less acceptable if the sacrificed object
is personally important to its owner. Although it might nor-
mally be acceptable to sacrifice someone’s towel to prevent
paint from spilling onto a carpet, this might be unacceptable
if the towel is personally important to the owner. Accord-
ing to Radin, this is because personally important items are
bound up in their owner’s identity, and the loss of such an
item cannot be remedied. Consequently, the personal im-
portance of an object may affect moral decision-making —
forbidding otherwise acceptable actions or exacerbating the
condemnation of some acts.
This possibility is relevant for theories of moral decision-
making. Many studies have investigated factors affecting
whether people endorse actions that secure an overall pos-
itive outcome while also causing harm (e.g., Cushman &
Greene, 2012; Cushman, Young & Hauser, 2006; Petri-
novich, O’Neill & Jorgensen, 1993). People often endorse
such actions when they cause harm only indirectly, as a side-
effect. For instance, people typically judge it acceptable to
save five people from being killed by a trolley if this re-
quires diverting the trolley so that it kills another person.
However, people are less willing to endorse harmful actions
that are direct and occur as a means-to-an-end. For exam-
ple, people are less willing to endorse saving the five peo-
ple when this goal requires pushing another man in front
of the trolley. According to one proposal, people are re-
luctant to endorse utilitarian actions in such instances be-
cause they involve personal harm (i.e., harm that is directly
applied to a victim), and considering such harm may trig-
ger a prohibitive emotional response (Cushman & Greene,
2012; Greene, 2007; Greene et al., 2009; also see Royzman
& Baron, 2002).1
One potential difficulty for this “personal harm” account
is that people are also unwilling to endorse utilitarian solu-
tions that involve damage to owned property. In a recent
study, participants judged it less acceptable to destroy one
valuable tapestry to save five others when this damage oc-
curred directly as a means rather than indirectly as a side-
effect (Millar, Turri & Friedman, 2014). Another study
found roughly similar judgments when the owned items
were rucksacks containing personal items, such as phones
and laptops (Gold, Pulford & Colman, 2013).
Such findings may conflict with the “personal harm”
account: When an object is sacrificed there is no direct
physical harm to a person, suggesting that sensitivity to
the means/side-effect distinction might depend on relatively
1Over time, there has been much variation in how “personal harm” has
been conceptualized (see Greene, 2009).
general factors that are not limited to dilemmas where
human victims are physically harmed (e.g., Cushman &
Young, 2011; Mikhail, 2007, 2009; Royzman & Baron,
2002; Waldmann & Dieterich, 2007). However, an alter-
native explanation is that judgments of personal harm are
the very thing underlying participants’ reluctance to en-
dorse sacrificing certain kinds of property. For example, the
tapestries in Millar et al. (2014) were described as unique
and irreplaceable, and so participants might have assumed
that these tapestries were personally important to their own-
ers. If so, they might have viewed sacrificing such a tapestry
as a form of personally harming its owner. This possibil-
ity can be tested by examining whether utilitarian decision-
making is influenced by whether a sacrificed object is per-
sonally important, or not, to its owner.
1.2 The current experiments
In two experiments, we examined whether the personal
importance of an object affects utilitarian moral decision-
making. In each experiment, participants read vignettes in
which one object could be sacrificed to prevent five other
objects from being destroyed. The objects were all owned
by different people, but were all similarly valued by their
owners. For instance, if the sacrificed object was personally
important to its owner, than the other five objects were also
personally important to their owners. In Experiment 1, we
show that personal importance affects utilitarian decision-
making when an object is damaged as a means, but not when
it is damaged as a side-effect. In Experiment 2 we replicate
this finding, and further show that similar effects are not
also caused by another factor leading objects to be valued
— monetary value.
2 Experiment 1
2.1 Method
Participants We tested 391 participants (mean age = 30.4
years; 41% female). In both experiments, participants were
located in the United States and recruited using Amazon
Mechanical Turk.
Materials and procedure. Participants read one of eight
stories, in a 2x2x2 design manipulating whether the destruc-
tion of one object could occur as a means of saving five other
objects or as a side-effect; whether the objects were person-
ally important to their owner or not; and whether partici-
pants read a story about posters in an art class or one about
clocks at an orientation.2 To prevent participants from using
information about personal importance to infer the mone-
tary value of the objects (e.g., personally important = ex-
2All materials are in the Supplement.
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pensive), all objects were described as inexpensive. In the
poster story, five posters were in the path of spilled paint,
which could destroy the posters. In the means conditions, an
agent could prevent this outcome by placing a sixth poster
in the path of the paint, destroying that poster in the pro-
cess. In the side-effect conditions, the agent could instead
block the paint from reaching the five posters, but with the
side-effect of redirecting it towards the sixth poster. In the
clock version, a dolly was rushing towards five clocks, and
they would be broken if it collided with them. However this
outcome could be prevented by throwing a sixth clock at the
dolly to knock it over (means condition) or by throwing a
stool at the dolly to redirect it, unintentionally, towards a
sixth clock (side-effect condition).
After reading the story, participants answered a test ques-
tion asking if it would be acceptable for the agent to destroy
the sixth object in saving the other five. Participants re-
sponded using a 9-point scale, ranging from “1-Completely
Unacceptable” to “9-Completely Acceptable”. Participants
were then asked three story comprehension questions. See
the Supplementary Materials for the stories and questions
used in all experiments.
2.2 Results and discussion
Preliminary analysis revealed the same patterns of findings
when we included all participants and when we excluded
those who failed comprehension question (n = 79); hence
we retained all participants for the main analysis. Prelimi-
nary analyses also revealed no main effect of cover story on
judgments nor any interactions involving story, all ps > .32.
As such, subsequent analyses collapsed across cover story.
A 2(means, side-effect) x 2(important, unimportant)
ANOVA revealed that participants were less accepting of
destruction caused as a means than destruction caused as
a side-effect (F(1, 387) = 10.23, p = .001, η2
p
= .03). Partici-
pants were also less accepting of destroying the sixth object
when objects were personally important to their owners than
when they were not (F(1, 387) = 19.36, p < .001, η2
p
= .05).
Moreover, we found an interaction between means/side-
effect and personal importance (F(1, 387) = 11.18, p = .001,
η
2
p
= .03). As Figure 1 shows, when objects were person-
ally important, participants were less accepting of destroy-
ing as a means, compared with destroying as a side-effect
(t(188.77) = –4.64, p < .001). In contrast, when objects
were personally unimportant, participants were not influ-
enced by the means/side-effect distinction (t(192) = .10, p
= .919). Moreover, participants judged it less acceptable to
cause destruction as a means when the objects were person-
ally important compared with when they were not important
(t(192) = –4.97, p < .001). On the other hand, judgments
of whether destruction could occur as a side-effect were not
affected by personal importance (t(195) = –0.84, p = .402).
These findings suggest that people view it less accept-
Figure 1: Experiment 1. Mean acceptability ratings rang-
ing from 1 (Completely Unacceptable) to 9 (Completely Ac-
ceptable); error bars reflect standard errors of the means.
able to destroy property to secure an overall positive out-
come when items are personally important, and property is
directly destroyed (i.e., as a means to an end). People might
view this as less acceptable because personally important
objects are closely connected with their owners (Belk, 1988;
Radin, 1982). Hence, people might feel that an owner is per-
sonally harmed when their property is directly damaged or
destroyed.
However, one limitation of our findings is that we only
examined the effect of personal importance for judgments
about inexpensive property (because all objects were de-
scribed as inexpensive). Hence, the findings leave open the
possibility that the interactions between means/side-effect
and personal importance might not hold if the objects were
expensive. Perhaps with expensive items, monetary consid-
erations would overshadow personal importance, and par-
ticipants would show sensitivity to the mean/side-effect dis-
tinction for expensive objects regardless of whether they
were personally important or unimportant. To examine
this possibility, participants in the next experiment read vi-
gnettes about items that independently varied in their per-
sonal importance and in their monetary worth.
3 Experiment 2
3.1 Method
Participants We tested 788 participants (mean age = 33
years; 40% female).
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Materials and procedure. Participants read a story in
which five mugs were in danger of being destroyed, but this
could be avoided through the destruction of a sixth mug.
Participants were assigned to one of eight conditions in a
2x2x2 design manipulating whether the destruction of the
sixth mug could occur as a means of saving the others or
as a side-effect; whether the mugs were expensive or inex-
pensive; and whether the mugs were personally important
to their owners or not. Participants were then asked the test
and comprehension questions, and a question about whether
they whether they had previously completed an experiment
on trolley problems.
3.2 Results and discussion
Preliminary analysis revealed the same patterns of findings
when we included all participants and when we excluded
those who failed comprehension question (n = 103); hence
we retained all participants for the main analysis. These
analyses also revealed the same patterns of findings when
we included and excluded participants who had previously
completed an experiment on trolley problems, so we again
retained all participants for the main analysis.
A 2(means, side-effect) x 2(expensive, inexpensive) x
2(important, unimportant) ANOVA revealed no effects of
expense — monetary value did not affect judgments in a
main effect or in any interactions (all ps ≥ .190). However,
replicating findings from Experiment 1, judgments were af-
fected by both the means/side-effect distinction and by per-
sonal importance. Participants were less accepting of de-
struction done as a means than as a side-effect (F(1,780)
= 20.36, p < .001, η2
p
= .03), and they were less accepting
of destroying the sixth object when objects were personally
important to their owners (F(1, 780) = 9.96, p = .002, η2
p
=
.01).
Moreover, as in Experiment 1, there was an interaction
between means/side-effects and personal importance (F(1,
780) = 8.04, p = .005, η2
p
= .01). As Figure 2 shows, when
the objects were personally important to their owners, par-
ticipants judged it less acceptable to destroy the sixth ob-
ject as a means than as a side-effect (t(374.12) = 5.24, p
< .001). However, when the objects were personally unim-
portant, judgments were not affected by whether destruction
occurred as a means or a side-effect (t(393) = –1.20, p =
.233). Furthermore, participants were more accepting of de-
struction caused as a means when objects were unimportant
compared with when they were important (t(396) = 3.99, p <
.001), but for destruction caused as a side-effect, judgments
were not affected by personal importance (t(388) = 0.26, p
= .799).
These findings reveal that the interaction between the
mean/side-effect distinction and personal importance holds
both when items are inexpensive and when they are expen-
Figure 2: Experiment 2. Mean acceptability ratings rang-
ing from 1 (Completely Unacceptable) to 9 (Completely Ac-
ceptable); error bars reflect standard errors of the means.
sive. The findings also suggest that when the personal im-
portance of objects is equated, their monetary value may not
influence utilitarian decision-making.
4 General discussion
We found that the personal importance of objects influences
moral judgments. In two experiments, participants consid-
ered scenarios where an agent could act to save five objects
from destruction at the cost of destroying a sixth object, and
judged whether this action was acceptable. The acceptabil-
ity of this action was reduced when two conditions were si-
multaneously met—when this required destroying the sixth
object as a means (i.e., rather than as a side-effect) and when
the objects were described as personally important to their
owners.
This effect held up independently of the monetary value
of the objects — it occurred for both inexpensive and ex-
pensive objects. In fact, we observed no effects of mone-
tary worth for these particular items. So, although we found
sensitivity to the means/side-effect distinction in scenarios
about personally important objects, we did not find this in
scenarios about expensive objects that were not personally
important. This may be surprising given that Gold et al.
(2013) found sensitivity to the mean/side-effect distinction
in a vignette about economic harms that were not obviously
personal. In that vignette, five people were in danger of
losing contracts worth £10,000, but this could be prevented
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by causing a sixth person to lose a contract for the same
amount.
One possible explanation for this discrepancy is that peo-
ple might be sensitive to the means/side-effect distinction
when considering decisions about very large monetary sums
(i.e., because Gold et al., specified very high monetary val-
ues, while we did not). Alternatively, it could be that partic-
ipants in Gold et al. inferred that highly valued contracts are
usually personally important to their recipients.
Regardless, the present findings suggest that people’s
judgments are broadly consistent with Radin’s (1982) claim
that utilitarian decisions are less acceptable if they involve
the sacrifice of an object that is personally important to its
owner. However, some of our findings suggest that judg-
ments do not neatly align with Radin’s view. Specifically, in
our experiments participants judged it less acceptable to di-
rectly destroy a personally important object even though this
was necessary to save other objects that were also person-
ally important to their owners. If personal importance were
paramount to participants, then they should have viewed
such utilitarian actions as acceptable — such actions allow
more personally important items to be saved. Also, Radin’s
approach does not explain why participants were sensitive
to the means/side-effects distinction.
The findings might be better explained by a more recent
account of moral decision-making, which holds that peo-
ple are reluctant to endorse utilitarian actions when they
involve “personal harm” — considering such harmful ac-
tions is thought to generate prohibitive emotional responses
(Cushman & Greene, 2012; Greene, 2007, 2009; Greene et
al., 2009; Moore, Clark & Kane, 2008). Our findings are
broadly consistent with this claim, at least if people typi-
cally view owned objects as extensions of their owners, or
as bound up in their owner’s identities. If people do conceive
of owned property in this way, then they might view the di-
rect sacrifice of such objects as a form of personal harm.
On this view, participants judged it less acceptable to de-
stroy a personally important object as a means because this
personally harmed its owner; destruction was more accept-
able when it occurred as a side-effect, because such indirect
harm is not viewed as personal. On this account, our find-
ings suggest that the aversion to causing personal harm is
not limited to the victim’s physical body, but extends to the
victim’s important possessions as well.
4.1 Limitations and future directions
Although we have interpreted our findings as contributing
to our understanding of moral decision-making, it is pos-
sible that the findings are not about morality per se. We
asked participants to judge the acceptability of possible ac-
tions, rather than specifically asking about moral acceptabil-
ity. Hence, it is possible that participants answered the test
question by thinking about other types of acceptability, such
as social or legal acceptability. It would be useful for future
investigations of the role of personal importance on utilitar-
ian decision-making to focus more directly on moral accept-
ability.
Future research could also try to attempt to come to a
more exact understanding of the scope of people’s sensi-
tivity to personal importance. A first question concerns
whether the effects we observed were driven by personal
importance per se, or instead by some closely related fac-
tor. For example, it is possible that participants were actu-
ally sensitive to whether objects were unique or irreplace-
able, a characteristic which might be implied by a personal
or sentimental connection to an object. If so, similar find-
ings might be obtained by manipulating whether objects are
unique, even if it were specified that they were not person-
ally important to anyone. However, we think this is unlikely
because participants in Millar et al. (2014) found it perfectly
acceptable for an agent to sacrifice their own property as a
means, even though the property was described as unique.
This suggests that participants’ sensitivity to the means-side
effect distinction hinges on factors relating the sacrificed ob-
ject to its owner (e.g., personal importance) rather than on
factors which primarily pertain to the object (e.g., unique-
ness). Nonetheless, it is possible that some other related
factor could underlie the present findings.
A second question of scope concerns whether the effects
of personal importance are limited to judgments concern-
ing the destruction of owned objects, or whether they could
influence judgments for many other kinds of negative ac-
tions. For instance, these effects might also arise in dilem-
mas in which people’s goals are frustrated or their relation-
ships are disrupted, because, like owned property, goals and
interpersonal relationships can vary in personal importance.
Similar effects could arise even for actions that physically
affect people’s bodies and physical functioning — people
likely give more personal importance to some aspects of
their physical selves than others, so personal importance
might affect moral judgments about harm to human bodies,
much as it affects judgments about the destruction of owned
property.
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